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ABSTRACT In Smart Island (SI) systems, operators of power distribution system usually utilize actual-time
measurement information as the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) to have an accurate, efficient,
advanced control and monitor of whole their system. SI system can be vulnerable to complicated information
integrity attacks such as False Data Injection Attack (FDIA) on some equipment including sensors and
controllers, which can generate misleading operational decision in the system. Hence, lack of detailed
research in the evaluation of power system that links the FDIAs with system stability is felt, and it will be
important for both assessment of the effect of cyber-attack and taking preventive protection measures. In this
regards, time–frequency-based differential approach is proposed for SI cyber-attack detection according to
non-stationary signal assessment. In this paper, non-stationary signal processing approach of Hilbert–Huang
Transform (HHT) is performed for the FDIA detection in several case studies. Since various critical case
studies with a small FDIA in data where accurate and efficient detection can be a challenge, the simulation
results confirm the efficiency of HHT approach and the proposed detection frame is compared with shallow
model. In this research, the configuration of the SI test case is developed in the MATLAB software with
several Distributed Generations (DGs). As a result, it is found that the HHT approach is completely efficient
and reliable for FDIA detection target in AC-SI. The simulation results verify that the proposed model is
able to achieve accuracy rate of 93.17% and can detect FDIAs less than 50 ms from cyber-attack starting in
different kind of scenarios.
INDEX TERMS False data injection attack, Hilbert-Huang transform, smart island, AC system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) usually concentrate on con-
necting the physical globe to the cyber and digital world; also
they are greatly utilized in the control of various industrial
systems until several individuals can be able to grasp numer-
ous kinds of required information in the real time [1]–[3].
The usage of CPS has a prominent potential of using in some
fields including power distribution systems and sewage treat-
ment plants. However, CPS safety subjects include integrity,
confidentiality and availability, which are different from tra-
ditional cyber-security problems. The SI is responsible for
monitoring, operation and control of transmission and distri-
bution of electrical systems that can remarkably develop the
reliability and efficiency of the power and energy systems.
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Eklas Hossain .
If such systems fail, they might have several negative and
harmful effects on other systems, and can lead to short-term
or long-term collapse in important infrastructures [4], [5].
Nowadays, numerous countries in the world regard the power
network system as a pivotal infrastructure and have formed
and stablished security and safety measures and related poli-
cies for this important issue [6]. Additionally, modern power
systems, these days, are becoming more and more com-
plex in the design and architecture; the phasor measurement
units (PMUs) were accepted to develop the reliability of
system. One of the advantages of this structure is the ability of
making fast decisions by utilizing the collected information
and data. Nevertheless, hackers are able to exploit vulner-
abilities to intentionally causes of overloaded tripping of
branches which might trigger a cascading fault and therefore
impose considerable harms to the SIs [7], [8]. Consequently,
the operators should take full account of the possibility of
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grid attack in controlling, operation and monitoring to deal
with the power network protection that requires the expertise
of the grid and remarkable energy. As a main component
of the proposed approach, Hilbert–Huang Transform (HHT)
can be employed. References [9], [10] presented HHT for
reduction and decomposition in the dimensionality of a sig-
nal. Generally, HHT includes two steps: first, performing
a data-adaptive decomposition approach named Empirical
Mode Decomposition (EMD), and second, applying Hilbert
spectral assessment to the decomposed signals which named
Intrinsic Mode Functions (IMF’s). Additionally, EMD can
have several advantages and benefits over the Fourier assess-
ment in which firstly, the oscillations embedded in every
signal would be extracted adaptively and automatically from
the signals; secondly, it would be relatively simple to per-
form; and thirdly, it would be specifically robust for every
non-stationary and non-linear signal. In addition to this, EMD
efficiently can capture non-linear specifications with regards
to the frequency and amplitude modulations by local time
scale. While IMF’s are taken, Hilbert spectral assessment
gives frequency data changing over period of time which is
a major component of assessment for every non-stationary
signal including cyber-attack signals.
A. BACKGROUND
Concepts such as Microgrid (MG), Smart Grid (SG) and
Smart Island (SI) in AC andDC power systemswith advances
in digital communication technologies have received more
attention in the past few years. Recently, several researchers
and studies have highlighted the vulnerability of traditional
AC and DC state estimators to the FDIAs in that an adversary
is able to present manipulated measurements to the mislead
operation systems [11]. Some kind of attacks are able to
bypass common Bad Data Detection (BDD) in the State Esti-
mation (SE) as the measurement remnants with FDIAs are
the same as the measurement residuals with no FDIAs. In the
FDIAs, the attacker can have aims to mislead the SE of the
system mechanism using sending corrupted measurements
which in turn will successfully and effectively pass the BDD
module and can bring mistake estimation in one or more of
the state variables.
One important point is that choosing the suitable set of
measurements to exploit between the accessible meters can
be more complicated. AC state estimators have been safe
against FDIA as long as the authors of the paper [12] showed
that even though attacks aiming DC state estimators might
not pass BDD in every AC-SE; nonetheless, an adversary
still was able to inject false data attack into the AC-SE, thus,
we observed that both AC and DC SE approaches were vul-
nerable and fragile to the FDIA. In reference [13], nonlinear
FDI attacks with inaccurate and wrong data were introduced.
Authors in the reference [14] displayed that an attacker was
able to do FDI attack on the sub-grid without having full data
about the whole power grid.
Another crucial point is that as an attacker, the issue of find-
ing the attack vector could be in general NP-hard [15]. For
this purpose, professionals and experts have suggested some
attack vector construction approaches taking into account
centralized and decentralized models. In reference [15]
authors have presented a greedy approach to seek for a sub-
system of measurement to be preserved by PMUs. Authors
in paper [16] proposed a connection between grid observ-
ability and attack detectability by a graph-theoretic design.
Machine learning approaches have also been presented in ref-
erence [17] to find stealth attacks (SA) in SE. Cyber-attacks,
also, in systems like Supervisory Control And Data Acqui-
sition (SCADA) can be very perilous, therefore, for such
systems this should be used in a particular path [18]–[20].
There is a prominent amount of publications on CPS in recent
years which a survey of this can be found in the paper [21].
Furthermore, authors of the paper [22] utilized noise fin-
gerprint processing and sensors in order to address stealthy
cyber-attack problems in CPS, and validated an approach in
a data set from an actual-globe water treatment plant, which
in this study the results displayed that the precision was about
98.1 percent. In reference [23] authors presented a Multi-
Modal Luenberger observer that could be able to isolate the
attacked sensors and SE of the basic dynamics of the remain-
ing sensors and their methods could be able to be performed
to large-scale CPSs. Reference [24] proposed a semantic
system grid-based orientation detection to find attacks on
control processing with utilizing grid traffic from water and
sewage plants. Such kinds of studies display the emphasis on
research in CPS safety; particularly, in the SGs that include
CPSs. The PMU or synchro-phasor was built upon the cyber
layer to serve real-time information [25] which can act as a
bridge among physical and cyber amplitudes [26]. Besides,
machine learning approaches have also been performed to
intrusion detection related issues; following studies can be
found in references [27]–[30]. Authors of the paper [27]
presented a machine learning behavior-based method for the
intrusion detection, and the data set that they utilized was
SecureWater Treatment (SWaT)-generated information from
eighteen attacks with ten type models. In paper [28] authors
utilized a rapid one- class category method that overcomes
the disadvantages of high sensitivity to the outliers; also, the
presented approach was examined on an actual data set from
distribution systems of drink water in France. In paper [29]
authors utilized a method named One Class SVM (OCSVM)
technology to discover SCADA grid intrusion.
B. MOTIVATION AND PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF
THIS PAPER
In this study, we propose an HHT-based approach to draw
out the dominant ingredients of a signal according to those
ingredients. The suggested approach can be categorized into
two parts: first, a signal will be decomposed using EMD; and
second, meaningful IMF’s ingredients will be opted using
Hilbert spectrum. In this regards, the suggested approach will
bring about development of FDI detection accuracy in AC-SI.
In the system, HHT is going to extract the state features
of system, and define a threshold to detect AC-FDIA from
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usual operation occurrences. The principal contributions of
this study are mentioned as follows:
• This paper is located between the pioneering research of
the use of HHT in the FDIA detection studies to diagnose an
attack that is new and effective.
• The suggested method is going to identify FDIA in
the AC-SI, specifically new attack templates with imperfect
power grid data.
• In this work, the presented mechanism will be evaluated
with the recently introduced FDIA template in SI case studies.
The obtained results of the simulation confirm the accuracy
and satisfactory of attack detection and the rate of false alarm.
• The test of parameter sensitivity is performed to assess
the efficiency and accuracy of the suggested method.
C. PAPER STRUCTURE
The article will be organized as follows. In Section II, we will
introduce the HHT approach and main concepts of FDI.
In Section III, we will evaluate the SI information utiliz-
ing HHT, and also, their ability for FDI attack detection
in different case studies will be presented. In Section IV,
we will discuss obtained results of the simulation, and finally
in Section V, we will present the conclusions of the study.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
A. HILBERT–HUANG TRANSFORM (HHT)
The growth of HHT is basically caused by the requiring and
describing nonlinear waves with changes in these signals
in non-constant processes [31]. HHT consists of 2 different
operations, Hilbert Transform (HT) and EMD, and these two
operations have to be performed sequentially.
A) Experimental mode analysis: The basic part of the HHT
is EMD. This is a sieving process that breaks down the signal
into a number of internal states. The main signal S(t) can be




ci (t)+ rn(t) (1)
It is noted that the first IMF (IMF1) c1 (t) consists of the
highest signal processing frequency and is often utilized as
the input for subsequent processing with HT [31].
B) Hilbert transform (Conversion): by considering IMFs
which is derived using the EMD approach, HT can be used for
any component of the IMF which is defined in equation (2).





π(t − τ )
dτ (2)
Considering this equation, ci(t) and H [ci (t)] are able to fig-
ure a complicated conjugate pair, that generates the analytic
signal zi (t).
zi (t) = ci (t)+ jH [ci (t)] (3)
Meanwhile, zi (t) can be given as the equation (4)
zi (t) = ai (t) exp(jωi (t)) (4)
Combined with instantaneous amplitude ai (t) and phase















As a result, the original data can be given in the form of
equation (8):





ωi (t) dt) (8)
where, the remnant rn(t) is remained and Re0 represents the
real part of a complicated quantity. Also, the signal spectral
energy can be given in equation (9).
E (H) = (ai (t))2 (9)
B. FDIAS THREATS
Owing to the complication and fragility of the data transfer
procedure in power CPS, many hackers might attempt to
manipulate sensor measurements, inject incorrect into con-
trolling commands and topological parameters, replay or
postpone sensor observations, and also carry out many other
destructive measures. As can be seen from the Figure 1, the
operations of achieving, transmitting, and integrating mea-
surement are threatened using stealthy FDIAs, which are now
recognized as one of the most dangerous threats to CPS of
power network.
Depending on the different ways of attack, FDIA attack
scenarios can be identified as follows:
A) Tune using readings of some sensors including different
intelligent user meters, PMU and Remote Terminal Units
(RTUs).
B) Directly attacks to communication grids.
C) Infiltrate the SCADA system and the Main Domain
Controller (MDC).
The final aim is to divide the accuracy and integrity of
the measurements to provide accurate and sufficient obser-
vations and operational limitations are used for SE to deduce
the operating modes of the system in smaller quantities and
then it helps the control center decide. Owing to the risk of
the predetermined subset, hackers can infect SE results to
mislead operators which lead to wrong decisions, and even
touch additional problems and power outages [32].
Therefore, it is important to figure out the AC-FDIA attack
mode, which can provide an opportunity for CPS of power
systems to increase reliability and performance economics by
developing appropriate interactions
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FIGURE 1. FDIAs threats in power CPS.
C. MAIN CONSTRUCTION OF AC-FDIAs
Hackers launched the FDIA by injecting false data into the
attacker’s vector z = [z1, z2, . . . , zm]T in order to disrupt the
AC-SEwhich is given in the equation (10), where, z generally
consists of magnitudes of voltage and phase angles, com-
plicated load injections at branches, complicated load flows
on branches which included of forward and backward direc-
tions); x = [x1, x2, . . . , xn]T defines the state vector (SV)
that included of phase angles and voltage magnitudes; h(·)
defines the nonlinear measurement function among SV x
and measurement vector (MV) z, that belongs the physical
parameters and features and also grid topology of the system.
Hence, measurement error vector e = [e1, e2, . . . , em]T will
be the matter for the Gaussian white noise (WN) division by
covariance R. In experiment, weighted least square (WLS)
approach is a common method to solve static ACSE [12].
z = h (x)+ e (10)
Due to the failure of communications or electromagnetic
interference, bad data is often present in the measurement,
which can bring about remarkable errors and faults in esti-
mating system modes. Therefore, the BDD module of EMS
is used to identify them that are based on the Largest Normal
Residual (LNR) approach. By assuming that the change vec-
tor of the SV x is determined as c, the residuals of the system
measurement before and after the attack would be r and ra.
In general, natural measurements z can cross the LNR-based
BDD module, by calculating the l2 − norm of the residual
measurement in order to detect bad measurements, we can
define equation (11):
‖r‖ = ‖z− h(x)‖ ≤ γ (11)
where in the equation (11), γ represents the detection thresh-
old of LNR-based BDD module.
Whenever the z-measurement vector is injected into the
false data, the effect of FDIAs on the BDD module can be
as follows:
‖ra‖ = ‖za − h(xa)‖
= ‖(z+ a)− h(x + c)‖
= ‖(z− h (x))+ (a+ h (x)− h(x + c))‖ (12)
where in the equation (12), za defines the compromised mea-
surement vector. In time of circumvent the BDD module to
remain stealthy, whenever hackers become familiar with the
topology of system and can have access to measurements,
the attack vector have to be constructed which is given in
equation (13).
a = h (x + c)− h(x) (13)
It should be noted that, in this case, the LNR value would be
unvaried after attack which means ‖ra‖ = ‖r‖ ≤ γ .
Unlike ideal conditions, it is highly unlikely for a hacker
to gain full knowledge of the system in practice. To address
this limitation, based on the attack model introduced in [14],
we obtain a sufficient number of practical AC attack samples
that they just need low prerequisites measurements in the
attacking area along with the border buses.
D. SMART ISLAND
Defining an island as intelligent and smart is related to
its ability to implement integrated solutions for managing
infrastructure and natural sources, called energy, mobility
and transportation, water and waste; all whenever promoting
using new and comprehensive social programs, governance
and funding plans. Introducing outstanding technologies
along with proper environmental management consists of
landscape protection and logical using of coastal and marine
sources, is an important part to fostering sustainable eco-
nomic and development activities on the islands. In addi-
tion, using information and communication technology (ICT)
ensures the availability of reliable data to improve efficiency,
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can decrease costs and increase the quality of local communi-
ties’ life, is of paramount importance features the SI concept.
With the growing trend towards a new type of energy market,
in that energy supply has been increasingly decentralized,
new forms of commercial models are emerging; consumers
are controlling their energy generation and consumption, and
technologies innovatively penetrate the market like smart
meters and electric vehicles (EVs) with priority of demand
management, so, islands appear as the ideal lands for testing
new technologies and scalable processes with the partici-
pation of all relevant actors, such as government officials,
water and electricity, market players, network operators, and
citizens.
However, because of these common trends, the inactivity
of politics and technology, along with the ongoing economic
crisis, prevent the islands from completely exploiting their
potential to host sustainable and innovative plans. This is
because of a wide range of factors. Such tests and scales
of innovative applications are considered as risky endeavor,
thus, new technological solutions can have challenges in
systems and economies of the island, and finally, technologies
and their consequences are not often fully understood in
different areas. In contrast with this drawback, the islands
have to build the groundwork for better understanding of
their potential and assessing priorities. This allows them to
take a holistic approach when developing and performing
new projects, including economic, social and environmental
considerations. Therefore, before an island is able transform
itself into a SI; it should be better first to find out precisely
where it is in relation to other regions by setting appro-
priate indicators to measure, monitor, and evaluate effects.
It allows sustainable islands to ensure that their ecosystems
are exploited while taking advantage of their comparisons.
Environmental CPSs are often utilized to monitor for under-
standing behaviors, and controlling the physical globe [33].
Because the representative CPS program is emerging, the
expansion of SIs has been seen. SI is a relatively new form of
power distribution system which connects power lines such
as traditional power grids as well as ICT infrastructure to
smart meters, which might be in the form of specialized tools
including telephones, mobile, laptops or other gadgets in the
island in oceans. Many of these SI devices allow data systems
to accomplish predictive assessment, which can balance the
generation and consumption of electricity in the network
system. Real-time pricing, for instance, gives consumers and
suppliers’ worthwhile clues to aid manage their demand and
energy resources. As a result, energy distribution that is able
to control the processes of energy production, consumption
and transmission can be carried out in a more efficient and
dynamic way.
Nonetheless, the incongruity, variety, and intricacy of
SIs provide fundamental challenges to ensuring the overall
integrity of the system [34]. This matter is because in the SIs,
network inference and decision-making might be carried out
on local smart components than on preserved control centers.
Thus, unlike common power networks where most attacks
FIGURE 2. Proposed FDIA detection approach.
and failures are transferred from physical access to impor-
tant facilities [35], the widespread use of SI components
invites most of these anomalies from cyber substructures. A
common SI attack is a FDI that can be utilized to distort
real power demand and supply resources. Therefore, energy
distribution might be incorrect, leading to further costs or
even more destructive risks. It is necessary to trust such sys-
tems and achieve security because national security and not
only cyber security can be compromised. Nonetheless, new
countermeasures against the FDI have concentrated on the
traditional state of the power systems [34], in that FDI attacks
on physical meters are performed rather than intelligent and
smart components [35]. Regardless of cyber-attacks and the
distributed design of SI substructure, these methods might
not dedicate any positive result with the full protection that
need to quickly make a decision for any local smart device or
component according to the status information. Considering
all the above mentioned issues, in this paper, a method which
can be easily performed on every smart island to detect FDI
in real time is presented.
E. PROPOSED FDIAS DETECTION SCHEME
Because the false attack vector satisfies Kirchhoff’s basic
underlying rules, it can escape the remaining BDD and
bring the system modes to deviate from normal events.
Nevertheless, we are going to make it clear that there is
time interdependence among dynamic system states, which
allows hackers to monitor the system for a long time and
continuously manipulate all relevant measurements to pro-
duce non-FDIA detection given a temporary correlation. This
complicated form of attack would be infeasible to create in
the actual power utilities [28].
Considering this issue, instead of out-of-line training and
the scattering of recognizing attack behaviors in previous
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FIGURE 3. Cyber-physical type of AC smart islanding: Blue arrows give the cyber layer; Black lines give the physical circuit.
FIGURE 4. Typical diagram of a three-phase MG with cyber-attack.
works, in this part, a real-time FDIAs detection mechanism
to identify possible attacks by recording changes in temporal
correlation properties between states of the systems is intro-
duces. Figure 2 displays the main structure of the presented
FDIA identification mechanism in real time. The signals are
retrieved and then the signal is processed by HHT to detect
the cyber-attack in AC SI.
III. CASE STUDIES
A. SMART ISLAND MODEL
Figure 3 depicts the islanded MG by m-th distributed pro-
duction units in the mode of parallel connection. Other
units are working in load sharing mode and current control
state [36], [37]. Some units in this MG are in the voltage
frequency mode. They are responsible for stabilizing the volt-
age of MG. Figure 4 illustrates the power circuit of a typical
three-phase inverter which connected to MG. For simplicity,
in this study, the single-phase system is examined first; the
equations are then generalized to these types of three-phase
inverters that the topology of all three phases being the same
as the single-phase system.
The block diagram of used single-phase inverter is dis-
played in Figure 5 [36, 37]. The LC output filter was
used to reduce the harmonic components of the output
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FIGURE 5. The scheme of a single-phase inverter.
voltage generated by the Pulse Width Modulation (PWM)
inverter.
The state equations in the single-phase inverter depicted in




+ Vo = VINV (14)




where, VINV = uVdc is the output voltage of inverter;
u represents the input signal of controller. By combining





























where in this equation, both capacitor voltage (Vo) and induc-
tive current (IL) are chosen as the state variables. Vdc also
represents the DC link voltage or Uninterruptable Power
Supply (UPS). Io and Ic define the filter output current and
the capacitor current, respectively.
Based on sliding mode controller, the index of cyber-
attack detection for FDIA in voltage and current parameters
is defined in equation (17) and (18) [36], [37].
SV = ˜̇x − λx̃, x̃ = x − xbase (17)
SI = z− zbase (18)
where SV and SI (switching surface of voltage and current) is
the voltage index and current index for cyber-attack detection,
respectively, which are applied as a input of Huilbert-Huang
transform. λ is a positive number, x and z are the SI voltage
and current, respectively. xbase and zbase are the base volt-
age and current of SI, respectively. xbase has a constant ampli-
tude and frequency. zbase is measurable for each agent.
In this paper, the considered autonomous AC-MG is dis-
played in Figure 6.
DC sources are connected to each other by DC-AC invert-
ers via tie lines, thus forming the physical layer of the
MG. Every DC-AC inverter works to maintain the output
voltage according to the values of reference generated by
the main and secondary local controllers. In this article, the
unexplained cyber chart from the communication grid has
been considered to send and receive data from its neighbors.
In addition, they are repeatedly connected at the output of the
converter of each unit.
The suggested attack detection scheme is performed on
a cyber-physical AC-MG as displayed in Figure 6(b) with
Vref = 110sin(2 ∗ pi ∗ 60). V includes three factors of equal
capacity connected to each other through resistance lines. It is
important tomention that every agent includes a battery factor
with DC / AC inverters are shown in Figure 6 (a). In order
to test the performance and feasibility of the presented attack
FIGURE 6. Intended system: (a) Agent model; (b) Cyber-physical AC-MG with three resources.
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FIGURE 7. FDI attack to the amplitude of voltage signal (cyber-attack has started at t = 0.2 second and has
eliminated at t = 0.4 second): a) Waveform of SI voltage, b) Empirical mode decomposition of input index of
voltage, c) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of input index of voltage.
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FIGURE 8. FDI attack to the frequency of voltage signal (cyber-attack has started at t = 0.2 second and has
eliminated at t = 0.4 second): a) Waveform of SI voltage, b) Empirical mode decomposition of input index of
voltage, c) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of input index of voltage.
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FIGURE 9. FDI attack by adding a white noise to the voltage signal (cyber-attack has started at t = 0.2 second and has
eliminated at t = 0.4 second): a) Waveform of SI voltage, b) Empirical mode decomposition of input index of voltage,
c) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of input index of voltage.
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FIGURE 10. FDI attack to the current signal on agent II (cyber-attack has started at t = 0.2 second and has
eliminated at t = 0.4 second): a) Waveform of SI voltage, b) Waveform of production DG2’s current, c) Empirical
mode decomposition of input index of current, d) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of input index of current.
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FIGURE 10. (Continued.) FDI attack to the current signal on agent II (cyber-attack has started at t = 0.2 second and
has eliminated at t = 0.4 second): a) Waveform of SI voltage, b) Waveform of production DG2’s current, c) Empirical
mode decomposition of input index of current, d) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of input index of current.
detection strategy for the AC-MG cooperative, several attacks
including the FDIAs have been tested on multiple sensors,
which are not usually detected by distributed observers an
is necessary to confirm security. The control system and
parameters were presented in our previous work in the ref-
erence [37]. Another important point is that every event in
the above scenarios is divided by a certain time interval for a
better understanding.
Case Study I: Instability arising from injecting an attack
by changing the amplitude of voltage signals.
In this part, an example of a FDI cyber-attack on the voltage
range is stated. An attack can be on a voltage measuring
sensor, the amount sent via wireless or fiber optic, or the
reference value given in the controller or changing the values
of the controller. To better understanding the issue, the attack
started and ended in a period of time. The attack started at
0.2 seconds and ended at 0.4 seconds. Sample simulation
results are shown in Figure 7. Figure 7(a) is the intelligent
island network voltage to which the FDI attack has been
reported in time. Figure 7(b) shows the Hilbert-Huang con-
version under different IMFs along with the residual value.
Figure 7(c) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy shows the Sv index
signal, which is able to detect a cyber-attack by determining
the threshold at 1000. This value (1000) is obtained according
to experimental results. The detection time is less than 5 ms
from the FDIA occurred.
Case Study II: Instability arising from injecting an attack
by changing the frequency of voltage signals.
In this part, an example of an FDI cyber-attack on the volt-
age signal frequency is described. The attack can be on a volt-
agemeasuring sensor, or the amount sent via wireless, or fiber
optic, or the reference value given in the controller, or changes
the values of the controller. To better understanding the issue,
the attack began and ended over a period of time. The attack
started at 0.2 seconds and ended at 0.4 seconds. The simula-
tion results of the sample are shown in Figure 8. Figure 8(a)
is the intelligent island network voltage to which the FDI
attack has been reported in time. Figure 8(b) shows the
Hilbert-Huang conversion under different IMFs with residual
value. Figure 8(c) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy shows the Sv
index signal, which can detect a cyber-attack by determining
the threshold at 1000. The detection time is less than 5 ms
from the FDIA occurred.
Case Study III: Instability arising from injecting an attack
by adding a white noise to the voltage signals.
In this section, an example of a FDI cyber-attack on a
voltage signal is expressed by adding white noise to the
voltage signal. The attack can be on a voltage measuring
sensor, the amount sent via wireless or fiber optic. To better
understanding the issue, the attack began and ended over a
period of time. The attack started at 0.2 seconds and ended at
0.4 seconds. Sample simulation results are shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9(a) is the intelligent island network voltage to which
the FDI attack has been reported in time. Figure 9(b) shows
the Hilbert-Huang conversion under different IMFs along
with the residual value. Figure 9(c) Hilbert-Huang spectral
energy shows the Sv index signal, which is able to detect
a cyber-attack by determining the threshold at 1000. The
detection time is less than 50 ms from the FDIA occurred.
Case Study IV: Instability arising from injecting an attack
by changing the current signal on agent II.
In this part, an example of a FDI cyberattack on signal
flow of units II is described. An attack can be on a current
measuring sensor, the amount sent via wireless or fiber optic,
or the reference value given in the controller, or changing the
values of the controller. In order to better understanding the
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FIGURE 11. Load changing: a) Waveform of SI voltage, b) Waveform of loads current, c) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of
input index of voltage, d) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of input index of current.
issue, the attack began and ended over a period of time. The
attack started at 0.2 seconds and ended at 0.4 seconds. Sample
simulation results are shown in Figure 10. Figure 10(a) is
the intelligent island network voltage. Figure 10(b) shows the
flow of the production unit II that was attacked by the FDI,
which was declared the FDI attack. Figure 10(c) shows the
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FIGURE 11. (Continued.) Load changing: a) Waveform of SI voltage, b) Waveform of loads current, c) Hilbert-Huang
spectral energy of input index of voltage, d) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy of input index of current.
Hilbert-Huang conversion under different IMFs with residual
values. Figure 10(d) Hilbert-Huang spectral energy shows the
signal of the S_I index, which is able to detect cyber-attack
by determining the threshold of 1000. The detection time is
less than 5 ms from the FDIA occurred.
Case Study V: Load changing.
In this part, the behavior of the system under load changes
is examined; the Hilbert-Huang spectral energy index of
the Sv voltage index and the SI current, which is used as
the FDI detection index, has been investigated during load
changes. Sample simulation results are shown in Figure 11.
Figure 11(a) is the SI network voltage. Figure 11(b) shows
the unit load current. As can be seen, the resistive and
ohmic loads are connected to the network at 0.2 and
0.4, respectively, and are disconnected both times at 0.5.
It is also connected to the system nonlinearly 0.5 times.
Figures 11(c) and 8d show Hilbert-Huang spectral energy
signals Sv and SI , respectively. As can be seen, it is less than
the threshold value for detecting a cyber-attack, and in this
method, the FDI attack is distinguished from load changes.
IV. DISCUSSION ABOUT SIMULATION RESULTS
Generally, it is said that when an issue is considered as a
cyber activity, it can be a positive decision. In contrast, it is
a negative decision when the model of anomaly detection
recognizes as a normal behavior. The true decision is made
whenever the pattern of abnormal detection is correct. As a
result, it is obvious that a wrong decision indicates a wrong
reaction from the cyber-attack detection model. Based on
this, it can be concluded that a suitable model for detec-
tion anomalies is a model with a low false rate. According
to these definitions, we can define 4 different type named:
False Alarm Rate (FAR), Hit Rate (HR), Correct Reject Rate
TABLE 1. Confusion rate matrix of the presented detection layout.
TABLE 2. Confusion result matrix of the presented detection layout.
(CRR), and Miss Rate (MR). In order to better understanding
of these issues, Table 1 gives the confusion matrix.
To verify the efficiency and validation of suggested
Hilbert-Huang transform in FDI attack detection, different
sample test is applied. The performance of the proposed
detection scheme is assessed through applying the FDIA
layout and the evaluation results are displayed. The efficiency
of suggested detection scheme is analyzed through applying
the FDI attack model and the evaluation results are in Table 2.
In addition, to show the efficiency of proposed cyber-attack
detection frame, it has been compared with Shallow model.
VOLUME 8, 2020 179015
M. Dehghani et al.: False Data Injection Attack Detection based on Hilbert-Huang Transform in AC Smart Islands
Table 2 can remark that the suggested technique can detect the
FDIAs with detection accuracy over 93%, and the detection
accuracy based shallow model is able to detect FDIAs over
90%, so, it shows the efficiency of the proposed detection
technique to detect the FDIAs.
V. CONCLUSION
The positive point of using HHT in cyber-attack detection
is that the signals in the SI are unstable, meaning that
their frequency changes with time. Hence, in this paper,
HHT has been presented to compute spectral energy for
FDI attack detection applications in AC Smart Islands. The
presented technique successfully identified the true time of
the cyber-attack by displaying a dramatic deviation in the
time frequency spectrum at the time of the FDIA occurrence
in AC-SI. The suggested scheme is able to detect FDIAs
such as cyber-attacks in current and voltage signals of sen-
sor or transmission data from wireless or fiber optic from
common system operating status variations like load varia-
tion. The simulation results on a test SI demonstrated and
proved the high performance and effectiveness of the pro-
posed scheme, especially in the FDI attack detection, where
the presented model was able to gain accuracy rate of 93.17%
(3% more than detection based on shallow model). Addition-
ally, the suggested protection scheme is able to detect FDI less
than 50 ms after cyber-attack is started in different scenarios
and it would be simple and easy to perform.
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